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VIRGINIA SECTION
THE THIRTEENTH ANNUAL SURVEY OF VIRGINIA LAW: 19671968

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
W. Hamilton Bryson•
This year's survey of Administrative Law focuses upon the four cases
involving administrative agencies or municipal corporations decided last
term by courts sitting in Virginia. Though few in number, the cases presented a wide range of issues including the review of a determination of the
State Corporation Commission on an application for a branch bank,1 a condemnation case,2 the availability of a tort remedy against a municipal corporationa and a contest over the constitutionality of the Virginia Industrial
Building Authority.4

Corporation Commission Appraval of Branch Bank
I

The delicate task of balancing the business interest in maintaining an unhampered potential for growth and customer service against the public
interest in avoiding unnecessary and destructive duplication of economic
effort fell once again to the Supreme Court of Appeals in its review of
the State Corporation Commissi?n's decision to act favorably upon the application of the Schoolfield Bank for a branch office in downtown Danville.
In Security Bank v. Schoolfield Bank5 the Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed the Commission's determination, which was based on evidence that
the sole office of the applicant bank was frequently crowded, was short of
parking space, and lacked drive-in facilities. In addition, the Commission
found that there was no room .for further expansion at that location, that
most of the bank's customers resided closer to the site of the proposed
branch office, that the seven intervening banks were all in good financial
condition, and that there was a favorable trend of economic growth in the
city of Danville. The latter two factors evidently assured the Commission
that the existence of a new branch would not jeopardize the position of the
other local banks. In view of this evidence the Commission specifically
• Member, Virginia Bar. LL.B., 1967, Harvard University; LL.M., 1968, University
of Virginia.
1 Security Bank & Trust Co. v. Schoolfield Bank & Trust Co., 208 Va. 458, 158
S.E.2d 743 (1968).
2 Fugate v. Martin, 208 Va. 529, 159 'S.E.2d 669 (1968).
3Mahone v. McGraw Edison Co., 281 F. Supp. 582 (ED. Va. 1968).
4 Button v. Day, 208 Va. 494, 158 S.E.2d 735 (1968).
5 208 Va. 458, 158 SE.2d 743 (1968).
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held that it was "satisfied that public convenience and necessity [would]
be served" 6 by granting the application.
Commissioner Catterall dissented from the opinion of the Commission
on the ground that there was no showing of any need for another bank
where the branch was to be opened since there were already seven banks
within one thousand feet of this location. But Commissioners Dillon and
Hooker and the Supreme Court of Appeals have ruled that "public convenience and necessity" does not mean an absolute or indispensable necessity/
but refers to a public need in the sense that approval of an application would
result in a benefit to customers and to the public generally. The Commission
found that this test was satisfied with respect to Schoolfield's application
because the establishment of the branch was necessary to adequately serve
the applicant's existing customers and to keep pace with the expanding
need for banking facilities which was expected to result from the renovation and expansion of downtown Danville.
In upholding this determination, the Court cited with approval Wall v.
Fenner 8 which interpreted a similar South Dakota statute and held that
the purpose of a statute requiring that the "public convenience and necessity" be served by the expansion of banking facilities is to protect the public
from the evils of unsound and imprudent banking. While the adequacy
of existing banking facilities may be considered in the determination
of public convenience and necessity it does not follow that because
there are adequate banking facilities that public convenience and necessity justifying another bank cannot exist. If such were the case,
the statute would tend to deter competition and foster a monopoly.
We are satisfied that this was not the intent of the legislature.9
The Virginia Court followed the reasoning and language of this case
closely in determining that the purpose of the Virginia statute is to promote a sound and responsible banking establishment and not to provide
unfair advantages to a few banks. In the Danville situation it was clear
from the evidence that the creation of an additional branch bank would
not injure other local banks, but rather would be in the interests of public
service and convenience.
The holding of the Supreme Court of Appeals is in line with the
Commonwealth's general policy of encouraging the growth of its banking
industry in order to be better able to meet out-of-state competition in
6 This standard for reviewing applications is provided by VA. ConE ANN. § 6.1-39 (a)
(1966).
7 208 Va. at 461, 158 S.E.2d at 745.
s 76 S.D. 252, 76 N.W.2d 722 (1956).
9 Id. at 259, 76 N.W.2d at 726.
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financing large projects, a goal which the previous fragmentation of the
banking establishment precluded. In 196210 banks were allowed to grow
by merging with banks in other counties so that Virginia corporations
would not have to seek investment capital outside the state. In addition,
the 1968 General Assembly granted the Corporation Commission authority
to amend the charters of state banks and give tltem powers similar to those
possessed by federally chartered banks.u In this manner state banks can
be kept in a favorable competitive position with national banks.

Litigation Against State Agencies
Two cases involving suits by or against the government were decided
last term: Fugate v. Martin 12 in the Supreme Court of Appeals and
Mahone v. McGraw Edison CoP in the federal court for the Eastern District of Virginia.
Fugate v. Martin was a condemnation proceeding instituted by the State
Highway Commission which sought to appropriate a narrow strip of the
property owner's land. In determining the amount of compensation to be
paid, the commissioners of the court took into account a deed between
the landowner's predecessor and the Highway Commission in which the
Commission had covenanted not to obstruct access to the property. Apparently accepting the property owner's contention that the, covenant
established a property right which was "taken" upon breach of the contract, and rejecting the Commission's contention that the deed was irrelevant
in a condemnation proceeding, the lower court accepted the commissioners'
findings and awarded the recommended compensation.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Appeals reversed the lower court on the
grounds tltat the commissioners should not have considered the deed between the property owner and the Commission. The Court's rationale
was that a condemnation proceeding is concerned with property rights
rather than contract rights; the breach of a contract is immaterial unless
it shows property damage arising from condemnation. Since the owners
had introduced the covenant not as evidence that property rights were
damaged, but in order to prove and receive damages for breach of contract,u such considerations were outside the scope of the commissioners'
function. That function, stated the Court, is merely to determine "the
value of the land taken and damages ... which may accrue to the residue
10 Va. Acts of Assembly 1962, ch. 404, at 565-66.
11 Va. Acts of Assembly 1968, ch. 325, at 434; VA. ConE ANN. §§ 6.1-5.1 (Supp. 1968).
12208 Va. 529, 159 S.E.2d 669 (1968). For further discussion of this case see Spies,
Property, 1967-1968 Annual Survey of Virginia Law, 54 VA. L. REv. 1244, 1246 (1968).
13 281 F. Supp. 582 (ED. Va. 1968).
14 208 Va. at 531, 159 S.E.2d at 671.
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. . . by reason of the taking." 15 Because this stat¥tory grant of power
must be stricdy construed,16 an alleged breach of contract by the Commonwealth may not be considered in a condemnation proceeding. The
proper procedure is to present the claim to the administrative department
responsible for the breach17 and sue the Commonwealth in the Circuit
Court of the City of Richmond if the claim is denied. 18
In the sovereign immunity case, Mahone v. McGraw Edison Co.p the city
of Richmond was joined as a third party defendant in an action for negligence brought by an injured man against the manufacturer of a defective
Switch activator assembly. The court ruled that there could be no recovery
by the third parry plaintiff from the city of Richmond because, in operating
the recreational facility where the plaintiff was injured, the city was performing a governmental function. 20 The court based its holding both on
prior case law and on Virginia Code section 15.1-291 which specifically
grants immunity to any city or town in the operation of a recreational facility in an action for simple negligence.21
While the general rule is that neither the Comm6nwealth nor its subdivisions or departments can be sued in tort, a municipal corporation may
be sued as if it were a private corporation for torts committed while it is
acting in a non-governmental capacity.22 In such a situation, notice must
be given within sixty days after the cause of action has accrued,2s and
jurisdiction and venue are governed by section 8-42.1 of the Code which
precludes a federal court from hearing the case.24
The main problem arising in this context is that the line of demarcation
between governmental and non-governmental functions is, to say the least,
somewhat vague. As the Court in Mahone observes, the general test is
whether or not the activity is proprietary. If it is not, and if the "act is
for the common good of all without the element of special corporate
benefit, or pecuniary profit . . . , there is no liability." 25 Such abstract
definitions seldom produce clear cut answers in concrete cases; and as the
15 VA. ConE ANN. § 33-63.1 (Supp. 1968).
16 E.g., Dillon v. Davis, 201 Va. 514, 519, 112 S.E.2d 137, 141 (1960); Painter v. St.
Clair, 98 Va. 85, 34 S.E. 989 (1900).
17 VA. ConE ANN. § 2.1-223.1 (1966).
1SVA. ConE ANN.§ 8-752 (Supp. 1968), §§ 8-38(9) to -40 (1957).
19 281 F. Supp. 582 (ED. Va. 1968).
2o Id. at 584.
21 VA. ConE ANN. § 15.1-291 (1964).
.
22Norfolk v. Hall, 175 Va. 545, 9 S.E.2d 356 (1940); Hoggard v. Richmond, 172 Va.
145, 200 S.E. 610 (1939).
23VA. ConE ANN.§ 8-653 (Supp.1968).
24 VA. ConE ANN. § 8-42.1 (Supp. 1968). This section _allows tort cases against local
governments and agencies to be brought only "in a court of the Commonwealth."
25 281 F. Supp. at 584.
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government increases its activities in areas previously reserved for private
endeavor, the distinction between the two functions is apt to become even
more obscure. In order to alleviate this inevitable problem, the legislature
should attempt to establish definitive guidelines for private citizens seeking
redress for the negligent conduct of municipal corporations.

The Industrial Building Autbority
The case of Button v. Day 2 6 involved an original petition for mandamus
to test the constitutional validity of the Virginia Industrial Building
Authority Act. 27 The Authority was an administrative agency established
by the General Assembly to encourage the development of industry within
the state and was delegated power to guarantee, out of a specific fund, loans
to private industry for the location of future plants within the state.
Although the General Assembly had appropriated 2500 dollars for the use of
the Authority, the Comptroller refused to disburse the money on the
grounds that the Authority's power contravened the credit clause of the
Vrrginia Constitution.28 The Attorney General then petitioned the Supreme
Court of Appeals for a writ of mandamus29 which was denied on the
ground that the Commonwealth was applying the credit of the state to
private debts in violation of the constitutional prohibition.
The credit clause of the Virginia Constitution is explicit in its language:
"Neither the credit of the State, nor any county, city or town, shall be,
directly or indirectly, under any device or pretense whatsoever, granted
to or in aid of any person, association, or corporation ...." 30
The Attorney General argued that the functions of the Authority were
to stimulate industrial growth, reduce unemployment and foster economic
well-being in the state, all of which constituted proper governmental
functions. In rejecting this contention the Court pointed out that not
every method for advancing proper governmental goals is necessarily permissible. It found that the primary function of the Authority was to
guarantee otherwise unobtainable loans which had been secured by private
firms from private sources to finance construction or improvement of
privately owned industrial plants; benefit to the state was only incidental.
The Attorney General attempted to deemphasize the credit-producing
function of the Authority by arguing that only one appropriation had
been made and that, due to the limited nature of the special fund, further
appropriations would not be necessary in the future. The Court made it
26 208 Va. 494, 158 S.E.2d 735 (1968).
27VA. ConE ANN.§§ 2.1-64.4 to -64.14 (1966).
28 A. CoNST. art. XIII, § 185.
29 Original jurisdiction over petitions for mandamus

v

ANN. S 8-714 (1957).
30 VA. CoNST. art. XIII,

s 185.

is provided for in

VA. ConE
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clear that, so long as the primary purpose of the fund was to grant credit
to private interests, ,it could not constitutionally stand regardless of how it
had been established. The Court intimated, however, that had the funds
been directed toward public ownership of the facilities, the Authority
would have passed muster even though the facilities might have been
privately operated. Moreover, the plan would have been permissible if
the money used to guarantee loans had not come from appropriations of
public funds or if the state had given money outright to the private
interests. But, as created, the Authority was clearly a government agency
holding funds for possible future payment of private debts and it clearly
transgressed the letter and the spirit of the credit clause.
At the conclusion of its opinion, the court pointed to a proposed
amendment to section 185 of the Constitution which had been approved
by the 1966 session of the General Assembly and referred to the next
session:
This section shall not be construed to prohibit the General Assembly
from establishing an authority with power to insure and guarantee
loans secured by first deed of trust or first mortgage on privately
owned industrial plants to finance industrial development and industrial expansion, and from making appropriations to such authority
to enable it to exercise such power.s1
Unfortunately this proposed amendment was not passed by the 1968 legislature. If Virginia is to continue with the Industrial Building Authority
program, an amendment such as this is a necessity.
Despite this painful lesson regarding extension of credit to the private
sector of the economy, the leaders of the Commonwealth should recognize
that a prudent approach to government support of industrial ventures can
be vital to the industrialization and economic well-being of the Commonwealth. The legislation establishing the Industrial Building Authority represented such an approach, giving creditors access only to a specific and
limited fund and restricting the power of the Authority to increase the extension of state credit or borrow money. With ~these factors in mind, the
General Assembly should again consider the 1966 legislature's proposed
amendment to section 185 so that the Authority can be resuscitated.

31Button v. Day, 208 Va. 494, 505, 158 S.E.2d 735,742 (1968). The resolution referred
to is S.R. No. 39, Va. Acts of Assembly 1966, ch. 726, at 1583-84.

